The agent host's vault and SilverBullet (M5.4)
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deploy/agent-host sets up the vault on nisse-host (infra/tofu#77) and
SilverBullet over it: the operator writes the vault, the agents' memory/
is read-only to it, and only the operator's Caddy reaches it, which
serves vault.dongar.net to the LAN. scripts/agent-host.sh installs and
checks it from here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J5Utyfzw7gF7UhjRDEtjTk
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dongarandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-18 20:55:21 +00:00
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# The agent host
`nisse-host.garrett-hall.com`, made by infra/tofu#77 (architecture X1). For now
it holds the knowledge vault and SilverBullet, the operator's view of it (L10,
M5.4). The agents' containers come later (M6.1).
## What's here
- `silverbullet/compose.yaml`: SilverBullet, its version pinned. It mounts the
vault, with the agents' `memory/` read-only, and its own data folder.
Nothing else of the host.
- `setup.sh`: makes the vault's folders, installs the stack under
`/opt/stacks/silverbullet` and the firewall, and starts it. Safe to run again.
- `nisse-firewall`: only the operator's Caddy may reach SilverBullet's port
(Docker's `DOCKER-USER` chain, re-applied whenever Docker starts).
- `caddy/vault.dongar.net.caddy`: the site for the operator's Caddy on
`docker.garrett-hall.com`. HTTPS from Caddy's usual certificate, LAN only.
## The vault
`/srv/nisse/vault`, one copy on the host's disk, nothing synced:
- **The operator's:** the root and everything in it but `memory/`, written
through SilverBullet. `infrastructure/` holds material for `nisse-ops`, which
`nisse-dev` will never be given.
- **The agents':** `memory/<agent>/`, one writer each, when the agents move in.
SilverBullet sees them read-only.
Backed up nightly with the VM (Proxmox; `backup: true` in infra/tofu).
## Installing and checking
From the development VM, with the bring-up key the operator added for `ubuntu`:
```sh
scripts/agent-host.sh install # copy this folder over and run setup.sh
scripts/agent-host.sh check # running, mounts, firewall
```
Then:
1. **The operator adds the Caddy site** from `caddy/vault.dongar.net.caddy`
and reloads Caddy.
2. **The operator runs SilverBullet's setup wizard at once,** at
`https://vault.dongar.net`. Until it's done, whoever opens the page first
makes the administrator account.
- Account: the operator's, with a strong password.
- Space: folder `/vault`, address `vault.dongar.net`, path `/`.
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# The vault's SilverBullet, for the operator's Caddy on docker.garrett-hall.com
# (/opt/stacks). HTTPS from Caddy's usual automatic certificate; LAN only.
vault.dongar.net {
# Anyone outside the LAN gets nothing. Caddy still answers Let's Encrypt's
# checks, which it handles before the site's own routes.
@outside not remote_ip private_ranges
respond @outside 403
reverse_proxy nisse-host.garrett-hall.com:3000
}
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#!/bin/sh
# nisse-firewall ADDRESS PORT: only ADDRESS may reach a port Docker publishes
# as PORT. Docker publishes ports past the host's own firewall rules, so the
# limit goes in its DOCKER-USER chain. Installed by setup.sh and run by
# nisse-firewall.service whenever Docker starts. Its own rules (tagged) are
# replaced each run, so a changed address leaves no old rule behind.
set -eu
address=$1 port=$2
iptables -S DOCKER-USER | grep -- '--comment nisse-firewall' | sed 's/^-A /-D /' |
while read -r old; do eval "iptables $old"; done
iptables -I DOCKER-USER -p tcp -m conntrack --ctorigdstport "$port" \
--ctdir ORIGINAL ! -s "$address" -m comment --comment nisse-firewall -j DROP
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Set up the agent host's vault and SilverBullet (M5.4). Run as root on the
# host, from this folder's copy (scripts/agent-host.sh install does that).
# Safe to run again: it changes only what differs.
set -euo pipefail
here=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
# The only address allowed to reach SilverBullet: the operator's Caddy
# (docker.garrett-hall.com), which serves vault.dongar.net to the LAN.
CADDY_ADDR=192.168.6.13
SB_PORT=3000
SB_UID=1000 # the image's PUID/PGID: the operator's side of the vault
# The vault. Its root and everything in it belong to the operator, except
# memory/, where each agent gets a folder of its own when it moves in. memory/
# is root's, and SilverBullet mounts it read-only besides.
install -d -m 0755 /srv/nisse
install -d -o "$SB_UID" -g "$SB_UID" -m 0750 /srv/nisse/silverbullet
install -d -o "$SB_UID" -g "$SB_UID" -m 0755 /srv/nisse/vault
install -d -o "$SB_UID" -g "$SB_UID" -m 0755 /srv/nisse/vault/infrastructure
install -d -o root -g root -m 0755 /srv/nisse/vault/memory
# SilverBullet's stack, where the docker role keeps stacks.
install -d -m 0755 /opt/stacks/silverbullet
install -m 0644 "$here/silverbullet/compose.yaml" /opt/stacks/silverbullet/compose.yaml
# Only Caddy may reach SilverBullet's port, re-applied whenever Docker starts.
install -m 0755 "$here/nisse-firewall" /usr/local/sbin/nisse-firewall
cat > /etc/systemd/system/nisse-firewall.service <<EOF
[Unit]
Description=Only the operator's Caddy reaches SilverBullet (deploy/agent-host)
After=docker.service
BindsTo=docker.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=yes
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/nisse-firewall $CADDY_ADDR $SB_PORT
[Install]
WantedBy=docker.service
EOF
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable --now nisse-firewall.service
systemctl restart nisse-firewall.service # picks up a changed rule
docker compose -f /opt/stacks/silverbullet/compose.yaml up -d
echo "SilverBullet is up on port $SB_PORT, reachable from $CADDY_ADDR only"
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# SilverBullet on the agent host: the operator's view of the vault (L10, M5.4).
# Installed to /opt/stacks/silverbullet by ../setup.sh. No secrets here: its
# accounts are made in its setup wizard and kept in its data folder.
services:
silverbullet:
# Pinned: the docker role updates stacks' images nightly, and a pinned
# version only changes in a PR here.
image: ghcr.io/silverbulletmd/silverbullet:2.11.1-slim
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
PUID: "1000"
PGID: "1000"
SB_NAME: Nisse vault
ports:
# IPv4 only; setup.sh's firewall lets only the operator's Caddy in.
- "0.0.0.0:3000:3000"
volumes:
# Its own accounts and settings.
- /srv/nisse/silverbullet:/data
# The vault, the space's folder: the operator writes everything in it...
- /srv/nisse/vault:/vault
# ...except the agents' memory, which only the agents write (one writer
# per folder, enforced by the kernel).
- /srv/nisse/vault/memory:/vault/memory:ro
logging:
driver: journald # logs go to the host's journal (L12)
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items. items.
**M5.4 The operator's view.** *Pre-approved.* SilverBullet in its own container on **M5.4 The operator's view.** *Pre-approved.* SilverBullet in its own container on
the vault: the operator's folders read-write, the agents' read-only (L10), behind the vault: the operator's folders read-write, the agents' read-only (L10). Done
Authelia. early on the agent host (`deploy/agent-host`), so the operator can keep material
for `nisse-ops` there now:
- The vault is `/srv/nisse/vault`. The operator owns its root and everything in
it but `memory/`, the agents'; `infrastructure/` is the operator's material
for `nisse-ops`. SilverBullet mounts the vault and, over it, `memory/`
read-only, and nothing else of the host but its own data.
- SilverBullet's version is pinned (the docker role updates images nightly).
Its accounts are its own, made in its setup wizard.
- Decided with the operator: behind their Caddy at `vault.dongar.net` for HTTPS,
the LAN only, with no Authelia (an internal instance; SilverBullet's own login
is enough), and its own instance rather than the operator's personal one, so
the vault stays one local copy with mounts enforcing its writers. On the host,
a `DOCKER-USER` rule lets only Caddy reach it.
### Phase 6 — Production ### Phase 6 — Production
*Waiting on infrastructure (2026-10-13):* the agent host doesn't exist yet, and *Infrastructure (2026-10-18):* VMs are now made by PR to `infra/tofu`
Terraform isn't running; the operator is planning both, Terraform with (OpenTofu), and the agent host exists (M6.1), holding only the vault and
`nisse-ops`. Until then M5.4 and M6.1–M6.4 wait, and the build VMs stay made by SilverBullet so far (M5.4). Until M6.2, the build VMs stay made by hand, with
hand (Ubuntu 24 now, 26 soon), with `vm ready` for a rebuilt one's host key. `vm ready` for a rebuilt one's host key.
**M6.1 The agent host.** *Needs discussion.* Containers, volumes, snapshots, **M6.1 The agent host.** *Needs discussion.* Containers, volumes, snapshots,
per-agent networks (X1, X2, X4). per-agent networks (X1, X2, X4). The host exists: `nisse-host` (infra/tofu#77,
2026-10-18; 2 cores, 4 GB, 100 GB, on VLAN 1, nightly Proxmox backups), requested
through nisse-dev's own quota to test that path; the operator may move it out of
the quota. It holds only the vault and SilverBullet so far (M5.4).
**M6.2 Build VMs by Terraform.** *Needs discussion.* The template, VLAN and egress **M6.2 Build VMs by Terraform.** *Needs discussion.* The template, VLAN and egress
(D7, X2), collection when idle. (D7, X2), collection when idle.
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# The agent host's vault and SilverBullet (deploy/agent-host), from this box.
# scripts/agent-host.sh install copy deploy/agent-host over and run setup.sh
# scripts/agent-host.sh check check SilverBullet runs and the mounts and
# firewall hold
# scripts/agent-host.sh ssh ... run a command on the host
# Trusts only the host keys bot-ansible posted (~/bin/tofu-wait.sh saved them).
set -euo pipefail
host=${AGENT_HOST:-nisse-host.garrett-hall.com}
key=${AGENT_HOST_KEY:-/root/nisse-e2e/ssh/id_ed25519}
known=${AGENT_HOST_KNOWN:-/root/nisse-e2e/nisse-host.known_hosts}
repo=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)
on_host() {
ssh -i "$key" -o UserKnownHostsFile="$known" -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes \
-o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=10 "ubuntu@$host" "$@"
}
case ${1:-} in
install)
tar -C "$repo/deploy" -cf - agent-host |
on_host 'rm -rf /tmp/agent-host && tar -C /tmp -xf - && sudo bash /tmp/agent-host/setup.sh'
;;
check)
on_host 'bash -s' <<'EOF'
set -u
fail=0
ok() { echo "ok: $1"; }
bad() { echo "FAIL: $1"; fail=1; }
cd /opt/stacks/silverbullet
[ "$(sudo docker compose ps --status running -q | wc -l)" -ge 1 ] \
&& ok "SilverBullet is running" || bad "SilverBullet isn't running"
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/)
case $code in 2??|3??) ok "it answers locally ($code)" ;; *) bad "it answers $code" ;; esac
probe=.nisse-probe-$$
sudo docker compose exec -T -u 1000 silverbullet sh -c "touch /vault/infrastructure/$probe && rm /vault/infrastructure/$probe" \
&& ok "the operator's folders are writable" || bad "the operator's folders aren't writable"
if sudo docker compose exec -T silverbullet sh -c "touch /vault/memory/$probe" 2>/dev/null; then
sudo docker compose exec -T silverbullet rm -f "/vault/memory/$probe"
bad "memory/ is writable from SilverBullet, even as root in it"
else
ok "memory/ is read-only to SilverBullet"
fi
sudo iptables -S DOCKER-USER | grep -q -- '--comment nisse-firewall' \
&& ok "the firewall rule is in place" || bad "no firewall rule"
exit $fail
EOF
;;
ssh)
shift
on_host "$@"
;;
*)
sed -n '2,7p' "$0"
exit 2
;;
esac
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"""The agent host's vault and SilverBullet (deploy/agent-host; L10, M5.4):
the operator writes the vault, never the agents' memory; nothing but the
vault and SilverBullet's own data is mounted; the image changes only in a
PR; only the operator's Caddy reaches it."""
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
import pytest
import yaml
HOST = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "deploy" / "agent-host"
VAULT = "/srv/nisse/vault"
def silverbullet() -> dict[str, Any]:
compose = yaml.safe_load((HOST / "silverbullet" / "compose.yaml").read_text())
return compose["services"]["silverbullet"]
def mounts() -> list[tuple[str, str, str]]:
out = []
for volume in silverbullet()["volumes"]:
source, target, *mode = volume.split(":")
out.append((source, target, mode[0] if mode else "rw"))
return out
def setting(name: str) -> str:
match = re.search(rf"^{name}=(\S+)", (HOST / "setup.sh").read_text(), re.MULTILINE)
assert match, name
return match.group(1)
def test_the_agents_memory_is_read_only_and_the_rest_of_the_vault_is_not() -> None:
by_source = {source: (target, mode) for source, target, mode in mounts()}
vault_target, vault_mode = by_source[VAULT]
assert vault_mode == "rw"
# memory/ is mounted over the same place in the space, read-only.
assert by_source[f"{VAULT}/memory"] == (f"{vault_target}/memory", "ro")
# Nothing else of the vault is mounted, so nothing gets around that.
others = [s for s in by_source if s.startswith(VAULT)]
assert sorted(others) == [VAULT, f"{VAULT}/memory"]
def test_it_sees_nothing_of_the_host_but_the_vault_and_its_own_data() -> None:
assert sorted(source for source, _, _ in mounts()) == [
"/srv/nisse/silverbullet",
VAULT,
f"{VAULT}/memory",
]
def test_the_image_is_pinned_to_a_release() -> None:
# The docker role updates images nightly; a pinned release changes only here.
image = silverbullet()["image"]
assert re.fullmatch(
r"ghcr\.io/silverbulletmd/silverbullet:\d+\.\d+\.\d+(-slim)?", image
)
def test_no_secrets_in_the_compose_file() -> None:
environment = silverbullet().get("environment", {})
assert not [k for k in environment if re.search(r"USER|TOKEN|PASS|SECRET|KEY", k)]
def test_its_port_caddys_and_the_firewalls_agree() -> None:
port = setting("SB_PORT")
assert silverbullet()["ports"] == [f"0.0.0.0:{port}:3000"] # IPv4 only
caddy = (HOST / "caddy" / "vault.dongar.net.caddy").read_text()
assert f"reverse_proxy nisse-host.garrett-hall.com:{port}" in caddy
assert "@outside not remote_ip private_ranges" in caddy # the LAN only
def test_logs_go_to_the_hosts_journal() -> None:
assert silverbullet()["logging"] == {"driver": "journald"}
def _can_use_a_network_namespace() -> bool:
if not (shutil.which("unshare") and shutil.which("iptables")):
return False
probe = subprocess.run(
["unshare", "-n", "iptables", "-S"], capture_output=True, check=False
)
return probe.returncode == 0
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not _can_use_a_network_namespace(),
reason="needs root, unshare and iptables to try the rule in a namespace",
)
def test_the_firewall_lets_only_one_address_in_and_replaces_its_own_rule() -> None:
script = HOST / "nisse-firewall"
steps = (
"iptables -N DOCKER-USER; iptables -A DOCKER-USER -j RETURN; "
f"{script} 192.168.6.13 3000; {script} 192.168.6.13 3000; "
f"{script} 192.168.6.14 3000; iptables -S DOCKER-USER"
)
run = subprocess.run(
["unshare", "-n", "sh", "-ec", steps],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=True,
)
rules = [r for r in run.stdout.splitlines() if "nisse-firewall" in r]
assert len(rules) == 1, run.stdout # run again: still one; changed: replaced
[rule] = rules
assert "! -s 192.168.6.14/32" in rule
assert "--ctorigdstport 3000" in rule
assert rule.endswith("-j DROP")
# Ahead of Docker's own return, so it's checked first.
assert run.stdout.splitlines().index(rule) < run.stdout.splitlines().index(
"-A DOCKER-USER -j RETURN"
)