The agent host's vault and SilverBullet (M5.4)
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deploy/agent-host sets up the vault on nisse-host (infra/tofu#77) and
SilverBullet over it: the operator writes the vault, the agents' memory/
is read-only to it, and only the operator's Caddy reaches it, which
serves vault.dongar.net to the LAN. scripts/agent-host.sh installs and
checks it from here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01J5Utyfzw7gF7UhjRDEtjTk
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dongarandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-18 20:55:21 +00:00
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# The agent host
`nisse-host.garrett-hall.com`, made by infra/tofu#77 (architecture X1). For now
it holds the knowledge vault and SilverBullet, the operator's view of it (L10,
M5.4). The agents' containers come later (M6.1).
## What's here
- `silverbullet/compose.yaml`: SilverBullet, its version pinned. It mounts the
vault, with the agents' `memory/` read-only, and its own data folder.
Nothing else of the host.
- `setup.sh`: makes the vault's folders, installs the stack under
`/opt/stacks/silverbullet` and the firewall, and starts it. Safe to run again.
- `nisse-firewall`: only the operator's Caddy may reach SilverBullet's port
(Docker's `DOCKER-USER` chain, re-applied whenever Docker starts).
- `caddy/vault.dongar.net.caddy`: the site for the operator's Caddy on
`docker.garrett-hall.com`. HTTPS from Caddy's usual certificate, LAN only.
## The vault
`/srv/nisse/vault`, one copy on the host's disk, nothing synced:
- **The operator's:** the root and everything in it but `memory/`, written
through SilverBullet. `infrastructure/` holds material for `nisse-ops`, which
`nisse-dev` will never be given.
- **The agents':** `memory/<agent>/`, one writer each, when the agents move in.
SilverBullet sees them read-only.
Backed up nightly with the VM (Proxmox; `backup: true` in infra/tofu).
## Installing and checking
From the development VM, with the bring-up key the operator added for `ubuntu`:
```sh
scripts/agent-host.sh install # copy this folder over and run setup.sh
scripts/agent-host.sh check # running, mounts, firewall
```
Then:
1. **The operator adds the Caddy site** from `caddy/vault.dongar.net.caddy`
and reloads Caddy.
2. **The operator runs SilverBullet's setup wizard at once,** at
`https://vault.dongar.net`. Until it's done, whoever opens the page first
makes the administrator account.
- Account: the operator's, with a strong password.
- Space: folder `/vault`, address `vault.dongar.net`, path `/`.
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# The vault's SilverBullet, for the operator's Caddy on docker.garrett-hall.com
# (/opt/stacks). HTTPS from Caddy's usual automatic certificate; LAN only.
vault.dongar.net {
# Anyone outside the LAN gets nothing. Caddy still answers Let's Encrypt's
# checks, which it handles before the site's own routes.
@outside not remote_ip private_ranges
respond @outside 403
reverse_proxy nisse-host.garrett-hall.com:3000
}
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#!/bin/sh
# nisse-firewall ADDRESS PORT: only ADDRESS may reach a port Docker publishes
# as PORT. Docker publishes ports past the host's own firewall rules, so the
# limit goes in its DOCKER-USER chain. Installed by setup.sh and run by
# nisse-firewall.service whenever Docker starts. Its own rules (tagged) are
# replaced each run, so a changed address leaves no old rule behind.
set -eu
address=$1 port=$2
iptables -S DOCKER-USER | grep -- '--comment nisse-firewall' | sed 's/^-A /-D /' |
while read -r old; do eval "iptables $old"; done
iptables -I DOCKER-USER -p tcp -m conntrack --ctorigdstport "$port" \
--ctdir ORIGINAL ! -s "$address" -m comment --comment nisse-firewall -j DROP
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Set up the agent host's vault and SilverBullet (M5.4). Run as root on the
# host, from this folder's copy (scripts/agent-host.sh install does that).
# Safe to run again: it changes only what differs.
set -euo pipefail
here=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
# The only address allowed to reach SilverBullet: the operator's Caddy
# (docker.garrett-hall.com), which serves vault.dongar.net to the LAN.
CADDY_ADDR=192.168.6.13
SB_PORT=3000
SB_UID=1000 # the image's PUID/PGID: the operator's side of the vault
# The vault. Its root and everything in it belong to the operator, except
# memory/, where each agent gets a folder of its own when it moves in. memory/
# is root's, and SilverBullet mounts it read-only besides.
install -d -m 0755 /srv/nisse
install -d -o "$SB_UID" -g "$SB_UID" -m 0750 /srv/nisse/silverbullet
install -d -o "$SB_UID" -g "$SB_UID" -m 0755 /srv/nisse/vault
install -d -o "$SB_UID" -g "$SB_UID" -m 0755 /srv/nisse/vault/infrastructure
install -d -o root -g root -m 0755 /srv/nisse/vault/memory
# SilverBullet's stack, where the docker role keeps stacks.
install -d -m 0755 /opt/stacks/silverbullet
install -m 0644 "$here/silverbullet/compose.yaml" /opt/stacks/silverbullet/compose.yaml
# Only Caddy may reach SilverBullet's port, re-applied whenever Docker starts.
install -m 0755 "$here/nisse-firewall" /usr/local/sbin/nisse-firewall
cat > /etc/systemd/system/nisse-firewall.service <<EOF
[Unit]
Description=Only the operator's Caddy reaches SilverBullet (deploy/agent-host)
After=docker.service
BindsTo=docker.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=yes
ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/nisse-firewall $CADDY_ADDR $SB_PORT
[Install]
WantedBy=docker.service
EOF
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable --now nisse-firewall.service
systemctl restart nisse-firewall.service # picks up a changed rule
docker compose -f /opt/stacks/silverbullet/compose.yaml up -d
echo "SilverBullet is up on port $SB_PORT, reachable from $CADDY_ADDR only"
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# SilverBullet on the agent host: the operator's view of the vault (L10, M5.4).
# Installed to /opt/stacks/silverbullet by ../setup.sh. No secrets here: its
# accounts are made in its setup wizard and kept in its data folder.
services:
silverbullet:
# Pinned: the docker role updates stacks' images nightly, and a pinned
# version only changes in a PR here.
image: ghcr.io/silverbulletmd/silverbullet:2.11.1-slim
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
PUID: "1000"
PGID: "1000"
SB_NAME: Nisse vault
ports:
# IPv4 only; setup.sh's firewall lets only the operator's Caddy in.
- "0.0.0.0:3000:3000"
volumes:
# Its own accounts and settings.
- /srv/nisse/silverbullet:/data
# The vault, the space's folder: the operator writes everything in it...
- /srv/nisse/vault:/vault
# ...except the agents' memory, which only the agents write (one writer
# per folder, enforced by the kernel).
- /srv/nisse/vault/memory:/vault/memory:ro
logging:
driver: journald # logs go to the host's journal (L12)
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items.
**M5.4 The operator's view.** *Pre-approved.* SilverBullet in its own container on
the vault: the operator's folders read-write, the agents' read-only (L10), behind
Authelia.
the vault: the operator's folders read-write, the agents' read-only (L10). Done
early on the agent host (`deploy/agent-host`), so the operator can keep material
for `nisse-ops` there now:
- The vault is `/srv/nisse/vault`. The operator owns its root and everything in
it but `memory/`, the agents'; `infrastructure/` is the operator's material
for `nisse-ops`. SilverBullet mounts the vault and, over it, `memory/`
read-only, and nothing else of the host but its own data.
- SilverBullet's version is pinned (the docker role updates images nightly).
Its accounts are its own, made in its setup wizard.
- Decided with the operator: behind their Caddy at `vault.dongar.net` for HTTPS,
the LAN only, with no Authelia (an internal instance; SilverBullet's own login
is enough), and its own instance rather than the operator's personal one, so
the vault stays one local copy with mounts enforcing its writers. On the host,
a `DOCKER-USER` rule lets only Caddy reach it.
### Phase 6 — Production
*Waiting on infrastructure (2026-10-13):* the agent host doesn't exist yet, and
Terraform isn't running; the operator is planning both, Terraform with
`nisse-ops`. Until then M5.4 and M6.1–M6.4 wait, and the build VMs stay made by
hand (Ubuntu 24 now, 26 soon), with `vm ready` for a rebuilt one's host key.
*Infrastructure (2026-10-18):* VMs are now made by PR to `infra/tofu`
(OpenTofu), and the agent host exists (M6.1), holding only the vault and
SilverBullet so far (M5.4). Until M6.2, the build VMs stay made by hand, with
`vm ready` for a rebuilt one's host key.
**M6.1 The agent host.** *Needs discussion.* Containers, volumes, snapshots,
per-agent networks (X1, X2, X4).
per-agent networks (X1, X2, X4). The host exists: `nisse-host` (infra/tofu#77,
2026-10-18; 2 cores, 4 GB, 100 GB, on VLAN 1, nightly Proxmox backups), requested
through nisse-dev's own quota to test that path; the operator may move it out of
the quota. It holds only the vault and SilverBullet so far (M5.4).
**M6.2 Build VMs by Terraform.** *Needs discussion.* The template, VLAN and egress
(D7, X2), collection when idle.
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# The agent host's vault and SilverBullet (deploy/agent-host), from this box.
# scripts/agent-host.sh install copy deploy/agent-host over and run setup.sh
# scripts/agent-host.sh check check SilverBullet runs and the mounts and
# firewall hold
# scripts/agent-host.sh ssh ... run a command on the host
# Trusts only the host keys bot-ansible posted (~/bin/tofu-wait.sh saved them).
set -euo pipefail
host=${AGENT_HOST:-nisse-host.garrett-hall.com}
key=${AGENT_HOST_KEY:-/root/nisse-e2e/ssh/id_ed25519}
known=${AGENT_HOST_KNOWN:-/root/nisse-e2e/nisse-host.known_hosts}
repo=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)
on_host() {
ssh -i "$key" -o UserKnownHostsFile="$known" -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes \
-o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=10 "ubuntu@$host" "$@"
}
case ${1:-} in
install)
tar -C "$repo/deploy" -cf - agent-host |
on_host 'rm -rf /tmp/agent-host && tar -C /tmp -xf - && sudo bash /tmp/agent-host/setup.sh'
;;
check)
on_host 'bash -s' <<'EOF'
set -u
fail=0
ok() { echo "ok: $1"; }
bad() { echo "FAIL: $1"; fail=1; }
cd /opt/stacks/silverbullet
[ "$(sudo docker compose ps --status running -q | wc -l)" -ge 1 ] \
&& ok "SilverBullet is running" || bad "SilverBullet isn't running"
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/)
case $code in 2??|3??) ok "it answers locally ($code)" ;; *) bad "it answers $code" ;; esac
probe=.nisse-probe-$$
sudo docker compose exec -T -u 1000 silverbullet sh -c "touch /vault/infrastructure/$probe && rm /vault/infrastructure/$probe" \
&& ok "the operator's folders are writable" || bad "the operator's folders aren't writable"
if sudo docker compose exec -T silverbullet sh -c "touch /vault/memory/$probe" 2>/dev/null; then
sudo docker compose exec -T silverbullet rm -f "/vault/memory/$probe"
bad "memory/ is writable from SilverBullet, even as root in it"
else
ok "memory/ is read-only to SilverBullet"
fi
sudo iptables -S DOCKER-USER | grep -q -- '--comment nisse-firewall' \
&& ok "the firewall rule is in place" || bad "no firewall rule"
exit $fail
EOF
;;
ssh)
shift
on_host "$@"
;;
*)
sed -n '2,7p' "$0"
exit 2
;;
esac
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"""The agent host's vault and SilverBullet (deploy/agent-host; L10, M5.4):
the operator writes the vault, never the agents' memory; nothing but the
vault and SilverBullet's own data is mounted; the image changes only in a
PR; only the operator's Caddy reaches it."""
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
import pytest
import yaml
HOST = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "deploy" / "agent-host"
VAULT = "/srv/nisse/vault"
def silverbullet() -> dict[str, Any]:
compose = yaml.safe_load((HOST / "silverbullet" / "compose.yaml").read_text())
return compose["services"]["silverbullet"]
def mounts() -> list[tuple[str, str, str]]:
out = []
for volume in silverbullet()["volumes"]:
source, target, *mode = volume.split(":")
out.append((source, target, mode[0] if mode else "rw"))
return out
def setting(name: str) -> str:
match = re.search(rf"^{name}=(\S+)", (HOST / "setup.sh").read_text(), re.MULTILINE)
assert match, name
return match.group(1)
def test_the_agents_memory_is_read_only_and_the_rest_of_the_vault_is_not() -> None:
by_source = {source: (target, mode) for source, target, mode in mounts()}
vault_target, vault_mode = by_source[VAULT]
assert vault_mode == "rw"
# memory/ is mounted over the same place in the space, read-only.
assert by_source[f"{VAULT}/memory"] == (f"{vault_target}/memory", "ro")
# Nothing else of the vault is mounted, so nothing gets around that.
others = [s for s in by_source if s.startswith(VAULT)]
assert sorted(others) == [VAULT, f"{VAULT}/memory"]
def test_it_sees_nothing_of_the_host_but_the_vault_and_its_own_data() -> None:
assert sorted(source for source, _, _ in mounts()) == [
"/srv/nisse/silverbullet",
VAULT,
f"{VAULT}/memory",
]
def test_the_image_is_pinned_to_a_release() -> None:
# The docker role updates images nightly; a pinned release changes only here.
image = silverbullet()["image"]
assert re.fullmatch(
r"ghcr\.io/silverbulletmd/silverbullet:\d+\.\d+\.\d+(-slim)?", image
)
def test_no_secrets_in_the_compose_file() -> None:
environment = silverbullet().get("environment", {})
assert not [k for k in environment if re.search(r"USER|TOKEN|PASS|SECRET|KEY", k)]
def test_its_port_caddys_and_the_firewalls_agree() -> None:
port = setting("SB_PORT")
assert silverbullet()["ports"] == [f"0.0.0.0:{port}:3000"] # IPv4 only
caddy = (HOST / "caddy" / "vault.dongar.net.caddy").read_text()
assert f"reverse_proxy nisse-host.garrett-hall.com:{port}" in caddy
assert "@outside not remote_ip private_ranges" in caddy # the LAN only
def test_logs_go_to_the_hosts_journal() -> None:
assert silverbullet()["logging"] == {"driver": "journald"}
def _can_use_a_network_namespace() -> bool:
if not (shutil.which("unshare") and shutil.which("iptables")):
return False
probe = subprocess.run(
["unshare", "-n", "iptables", "-S"], capture_output=True, check=False
)
return probe.returncode == 0
@pytest.mark.skipif(
not _can_use_a_network_namespace(),
reason="needs root, unshare and iptables to try the rule in a namespace",
)
def test_the_firewall_lets_only_one_address_in_and_replaces_its_own_rule() -> None:
script = HOST / "nisse-firewall"
steps = (
"iptables -N DOCKER-USER; iptables -A DOCKER-USER -j RETURN; "
f"{script} 192.168.6.13 3000; {script} 192.168.6.13 3000; "
f"{script} 192.168.6.14 3000; iptables -S DOCKER-USER"
)
run = subprocess.run(
["unshare", "-n", "sh", "-ec", steps],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=True,
)
rules = [r for r in run.stdout.splitlines() if "nisse-firewall" in r]
assert len(rules) == 1, run.stdout # run again: still one; changed: replaced
[rule] = rules
assert "! -s 192.168.6.14/32" in rule
assert "--ctorigdstport 3000" in rule
assert rule.endswith("-j DROP")
# Ahead of Docker's own return, so it's checked first.
assert run.stdout.splitlines().index(rule) < run.stdout.splitlines().index(
"-A DOCKER-USER -j RETURN"
)