An exhausted budget was a special case of something more general: the
work is not at fault. A network blip, a timeout, a 5xx from the proxy,
or a rate limit that did not clear all leave a delegation branch that
may be perfectly good, and discarding it would throw away work for a
reason that has nothing to do with the work.
UpstreamUnavailable now names that family, with BudgetExhausted a
member of it — distinguishable where the difference matters, since a
budget will not clear within the hour while a network blip will. A
delegation stopped by any of them is "interrupted": branch kept,
intent left pending, and A3's resume rule picks it up.
The benefit of the doubt stops at the server's own door. A 4xx that is
not a rate limit means the request itself was wrong, and preserving
branches on the strength of one would hide a real bug — so those still
fail and clean up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Exceeding a LiteLLM spend limit takes external models away for the
rest of the day, which makes three existing gaps consequential rather
than untidy.
- A13 calls the delegation caps hard on "turns, tokens, and wall
clock", and the module docstring repeated it, but the token cap was
decoration: nothing counted, and result.tokens was always zero. It
is now metered from the usage the provider reports, so a confused
delegate cannot spend a day's allowance. A5 keeps the *money* cap on
the LiteLLM key, which is a different thing; this is a scope cap
- The normalized route sent no ceiling at all, so truncation detection
there had nothing to detect against. Both routes now send one
- A budget refusal is recognised distinctly. It is not a rate limit:
retrying cannot help, so the planner no longer burns a second call
to fail identically
And a delegation cut off by an exhausted budget is now "interrupted"
rather than "failed", which preserves its branch and leaves its intent
pending. The work on that branch may be perfectly good; discarding it
because the budget ran out would throw away work for a reason that has
nothing to do with the work. A3's resume rule already knows how to
pick such a delegation back up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two gaps found by auditing spec against code, the second created by
7b landing the harness without its boot-time half.
**The harness was not connected to anything.** Only a live test
constructed a Delegation; A12's failure-count trigger still gated to
the human, which A13 describes as the fallback rather than the path.
Consecutive command failures now hand the sub-task to the delegate,
with the failures in the brief so it need not rediscover what the
local model learned the hard way. A usable handback lets the local
loop carry on; anything else escalates, because a cap breach leaves a
half-edited tree.
**A3 step 5 was unimplemented.** A crash mid-delegation failed safe —
boot gated on "restarted mid-EXECUTING" — but always gated, even on
the clean cut the spec says should resume, and left the branch orphaned
because _abandon only runs while the process lives.
- A delegation now records an intent before the branch exists, and
settles it whichever way the delegation ends; an aborted delegation
is a finished one, and leaving it pending would make the next boot
believe work was still in flight
- delegation_verdict implements the clean-cut test as an observable
check, never model self-assessment: settled if a completion follows
the start, absent if the branch was never created, gate on a
tool_call with no recorded result, resume otherwise
- recover() sweeps at boot, announcing a resume with a notice rather
than a question, since a clean cut needs no decision from the
operator, and leaving an unclean one pending so the generic sweep
gates on it
- resume() continues the same delegation rather than starting a
second: no new branch, no second delegation_started, because A10
defines a session as the delegation, not the process lifetime
Honest limit, stated in the code: "the branch sits at the expected
commit" is approximated by the branch existing and carrying the work,
since per-turn shas are not recorded in the log, so a branch rewritten
underneath us would go undetected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A frontier model receives a scoped sub-task, works autonomously with
full tool access, and hands back; the local loop reads the handback
note and the file state, never the reasoning.
- Branch at delegation start, and abort discards it. That required
committing each turn's work onto the branch: without commits,
deleting a branch discards nothing, so "abort discards the work"
was a comforting phrase rather than a fact. The caller's own
in-flight changes are committed to their branch first, so an abort
cannot destroy work nobody delegated
- Hard caps on turns and wall clock; a breach is a defined failure
return, and its result is not usable, so the caller gates rather
than resuming on a half-edited tree
- Every event is checkpointed as it arrives, so a crash mid-delegation
leaves the branch at a known commit and a truthful transcript
- Handback is validated locally: blank fields or a non-boolean success
flag are refused and the delegation continues rather than accepting
a useless note
Two failure modes found by running it against a real model:
- A success claim with nothing changed was accepted. The handback plus
file state is the entire interface back, so a note describing work
that does not exist is worse than no note. Success now requires a
successful mutating tool call; reporting failure still does not,
since "this is impossible" is a legitimate finding
- The delegate invented the absolute path /workspace, wrote there, ran
its tests there, and handed back truthfully — with the repo empty
and git seeing nothing. Writes outside the workspace are now refused
with a message naming the real root, and both prompts state where
the workspace is instead of leaving the model to guess. This is not
sandboxing: work outside the repo is invisible to git, so the
milestone would publish an empty PR
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>